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Abstract
By observing the fact that moving in a straight line is a common flying behavior of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) in normal applications, e.g., power line inspections, and air patrols along with
highway/streets/borders, in this paper we investigate the secrecy outage performance of a UAV system
with linear trajectory, where a UAV (S) flies in a straight line and transmits its information over the
downlink to a legitimate receiver (D) on the ground while an eavesdropping UAV (E) trying to overhear
the information delivery between S and D. Meanwhile, some information is delivered to S over the
uplink from D, such as commanding messages to control S’s detecting operations, which can also be
eavesdropped by E. The locations of S, D, and E are randomly distributed. We first characterize the
statistical characteristics (including cumulative distribution functions and probability density function) of
the received signal-to-noise ratio over both downlink and uplink, and then the closed-form analytical
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2expressions for the lower boundary of the secrecy outage probability of both downlink and uplink
have also been derived accordingly. Finally, Monte-Carlo simulations are given to testify our proposed
analytical models.
Index Terms
Linear trajectory, secrecy outage probability, stochastic geometry, unmanned aerial vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
Benefiting from the unique characteristics, e.g., fast deployment, easy programmability, reconfigura-
tion, control flexibility, and scalability, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) gets more and more popular
and are always used for inspection and supervision purposes, such as power line inspection, mar-
itime/harbor/border/highway/street patrol, and police surveillance (like scouting property and locating
fugitives) [1–6]. In these application scenarios, moving in a straight line is a common flying behavior
for UAVs, leading to the linear distribution of the positions of the UAVs, which is different from some
other cases that UAVs can locate at any positions in the target zones.
Similar to common territorial wireless systems, information security problems also exist in UAV
communication systems, as open wireless channels are employed to deliver information. Observing the fact
that wireless security can be enhanced in the physical layer, rather than only relying upon generic higher-
layer cryptographic mechanisms, physical layer security has been broadly considered as a practicable
approach to protecting the data confidentiality from eavesdropping in wireless communication systems
[7–10], and wireless optical communication systems [11–13]. Recently, some researchers pay their
attenuations on realizing and enhancing the secure information delivery in common UAV communication
systems in term of cooperative transmission, trajectory design, UAV placement, power control, jamming
design, and performance modeling [14–24].
As UAV can be flexibly placed in the sky, it is naturally employed to set up or improve the quality
of the information delivery over the link between a source and a destination, which suffers deep fading
or obstacles, to realize future networks, e.g., sustainable access networks and ultra-dense heterogeneous
networks [25, 26]. Then, similar to traditional cooperative systems on the ground, under this case the
probability of information leakage always increases, as introducing UAV relay will inevitably increase
the opportunity for the eavesdropper to overhear the transmitted information. In [14], security was
studied from multiple UAV control perspective, namely, spatially secure group communication problem is
presented and solved to maximize spatial UAV group size while minimizing the communication boundary
of the group. To promise the secrecy requirement, it is important to choose the location of the UAV
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3relay, which was studied in Ref. [15]. The authors of Ref. [16] investigated the secure transmissions of
millimeter-wave simultaneous wireless information and power transfer UAV relay networks.
On the other handle, due to the growing cost of infrastructure and the increasing requirements on the
performance, UAV’s mobility can be exploited to fulfill the requirements arisen day and day. So, the
transmission quality between UAV and ground users can be greatly improved via carefully adjusting or
calculating UAV’s trajectory, while achieving a reasonable balance between the cost and the performance.
Ref. [17] jointly adjusted UAV trajectories and user scheduling to maximize the minimum worst-case
secrecy rate among the users within each period under various constraints, e.g., the maximum UAV speed
constraints, UAV return constraints, UAV collision avoidance constraints, etc. In [18], the high mobility
of UAV was exploited to proactively establish favorable and degraded channels for the legitimate and
eavesdropping links, and then to maximize the average secrecy rates of UAV-to-ground and ground-to-
UAV transmissions, UAV’s trajectory and the transmit power of the legitimate transmitter were jointly
optimized.
Moreover, jamming has been widely regarded as a realistic method to improve the secrecy performance
of wireless communication systems. Then, the jamming method has also been introduced into UAV
communication systems. In [19], the source was designed to transmit artificial noise signals, in addition
to information signals, to confuse this eavesdropper. In [20], a cooperative UAV was considered to
transmit the jamming signal. Furthermore, the authors maximized the minimum secrecy rate among the
ground users by jointly optimizing the trajectory and the transmit power of the UAVs as well as the user
scheduling.
Since performance modeling is an efficient way to study and understand the performance of commu-
nication systems, researchers set up mathematic models to investigate the secrecy performance of UAV
communication systems. The influence of the randomness of the location of UAV has been studied for
UAV-to-UAV and UAV-to-ground links while suffering multiple eavesdropping UAVs in [21–23]. The
analytical expression was derived for the secure connection probability of the legitimate ground link in
the presence of non-colluding UAV eavesdroppers [24].
Therefore, it is clear that no works have been presented to study the secure information delivery
in UAV systems with linear trajectory, though there are some works proposed for various kinds of
UAV communication systems. To fulfill this blank and understand how system factors affect the secrecy
performance, it is necessary to investigate the secure information transmission in UAV systems with linear
trajectory. In this work, a UAV system with a linear trajectory is considered, where a UAV (S) is adopted
to perform inspection/supervision. Especially, S moves in a straight line (e.g., power line inspections, and
air patrols along with highway/streets/borders), and sends back inspection data to a ground receiver (G).
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4Simultaneously, there is an eavesdropping UAV (E) trying to overhear the information delivery between
S and G.
Similar to [27, 28], the impacts of the randomness of S and E in 3-dimensional space, and that of G
on the ground on the secrecy outage performance of the considered UAV system with linear trajectory
are investigated by employing stochastic geometry theory.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) We characterize the statistical characteristics (including cumulative distribution functions (CDF)
and probability density function (PDF)) of the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at E, G over the
downlink, and at S over the uplink, respectively;
2) We derive the closed-form analytical expressions for the lower boundary of the secrecy outage
probability (SOP) of uplink and downlink, respectively;
3) We systematically study and summarize the impacts of the radius of the coverage space of S and
G, the transmit SNR at S and G, and the height of UAV on the secrecy performance of the considered
system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the considered power-line inspection UAV
system is described. In Section III and IV, the secrecy outage analysis is conducted for both the uplink
and the downlink, respectively. Also, closed-form analytical expressions for the lower boundary of the
SOP of both uplink and downlink are derived. In Section V, numerical results for the secrecy outage are
presented and discussed. Finally, we conclude the paper with some remarks in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, a UAV system with linear trajectory is considered, in which S is adopted to perform
inspection/supervision. Specially, S moves in a straight line (e.g., power line inspections, and air patrols
along with highway/streets/borders), and sends back inspection data to G. Simultaneously, E tries to
overhear the information transmissions between S and G. In other words, E can eavesdrop the information
delivery over both the uplink link from G to S and the downlink from S to G. To facilitate the illustration,
we take power line inspection as an example of the considered system, shown in Fig. 1. Furthermore,
an omnidirectional transmission antenna is assumed to be employed at both S and G. In this work, we
also assume that all links suffer independent Rayleigh fading to reflect the effects of small-scale fading,
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5namely, the channel gain hjk ∼ CN (0, gjk), where gjk = E
(
|hjk|2
)
and j, k ∈ {G,S,E}1.
Fig. 1: Automatic power-line inspection UAV system.
In this work, it is assumed that the trajectory of S is in a straight line for tractability purposes. This
assumption is reasonable, as S normally flies along with highway/streets/borders to inspect/monitor and
gather the state information. Furthermore, we also assume that E is uniformly distributed in the airspace
to eavesdrop the information delivery between S and G2.
As depicted in Fig. 2, during the uplink transmission stage, the coverage space of G is a hemisphere
with radius RG, the center of which is G3. As presented in Fig. 3, in the downlink delivery stage, the
coverage space of S is a spherical cap with height RS + h (where RC =
√
R2S − h2) and the radius of
the base RC (where 0 ≤ h ≤ RS). Moreover, it is easy to obtain the volumes of the coverage spaces of
G and S as VG = 23piR
3
G and VS1 =
pi
3
(
4R3S − 3RSh2 + h3
)
, respectively.
In the following two sections, secrecy outage analysis will be presented for the information delivery
over uplink and downlink, respectively.
1In this work, non-line-of-sight (NLOS) propagation scenarios (e.g., UAVs are employed to patrol and monitor the urban
streets) are considered to facilitate presenting the technical road-map on analyzing the SOP of the considered system, which
can serve as a useful reference to study the performance of similar systems, no matter in NLOS or line-of-sight propagation
scenarios.
2In this work, passive eavesdropping is considered, which can realize the optimal eavesdropping from E’s side. If the operating
space of the legitimate users is open, E can share this space with legitimate users and pretend to be the legal user, and then
it can approach the legitimate users with no doubts. Therefore, here we do not consider the minimum distance between E and
legitimate users for simplification.
3In practical, UAVs suffer their minimum flying heights ranging from meters or more, which depends on the designs and
application purposes. Similar to the analysis on traditional wireless systems, in order to facilitate theoretical analysis, in this
work the minimum operating heights of the UAVs and the height of the transceiver antennas at G are ignored.
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6Fig. 2: Uplink model.
Fig. 3: Downlink model.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE ANALYSIS FOR THE UPLINK
As depicted in Fig. 2, it is assumed that S is uniformly distributed in a straight-line segment AB, the
length of which l (0 < l ≤ 2RG) is determined by the juncture points of power-line and the coverage
space of G. E is uniformly distributed in the hemisphere with radius RG and center G.
A. Signal model
The received signals at S and E can be respectively written as
yS =
√
PGd
−n
S hGSsG + zS (1)
and
yE =
√
PGd
−n
E hGEsG + zE , (2)
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7Fig. 4: An isosceles triangle.
where PG is the transmit power at G, sG denotes the transmitted symbols from G, dS is the distance
between G and S, dE is the distance between G and E, n is the path-loss exponent, zS and zE denote
the independent complex Gaussian noise at S and E, respectively. In this work, to simplify the analysis,
we assume that zS and zE are with zero means and a same variances, N0.
Therefore, the received SNR at S and E can be further given as
γS =
PG|hGS |2
dnSN0
= λG
|hGS |2
dnS
(3)
and
γE =
PG|hGE |2
dnEN0
= λG
|hGE |2
dnE
, (4)
respectively, where λG = PGN0 .
As in this work all links suffer independent Rayleigh fading, we can obtain the PDF of |hjk|2 (j, k ∈
{G,S,E}) as
f|hjk|2 (x) =
1
gjk
exp
(
− x
gjk
)
, (5)
where gjk is the mean value of the power gain, |hjk|2.
B. The Derivation of The CDF of γS
In order to facilitate the following analysis, we first give a useful theorem to characterize the statistical
characteristics of dS as follows:
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8Theorem 1. As shown in Fig. 4, given an isosceles triangle 4GAB, in which GA = GB = b, AB = l,
S is uniformly distributed over AB, C is the midpoint of AB, AS = x (0 ≤ x ≤ l) and GS = y
(c =
√
b2 − l24 ≤ y ≤ b). Thus, the PDF of y can be written as
fY (y) =

4y
l
√
4y2+l2−4b2 if
√
b2 − l24 ≤ y ≤ b
0 else
. (6)
Proof. Please refer to Appendix A.
Corollary 1. As shown in Fig. 2, S is uniformly distributed in AB and G is at the centra of the
hemisphere. Then, the the PDF of the distance between S and G, dS , can be given as
fdS (x) =

4x
l
√
4x2+l2−4b2, if
√
b2 − l24 ≤ x ≤ b
0, else
. (7)
Proof. Eq. (7) can be easily achieved by applying Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. Considering the randomness of the position of S, the PDF of dnS/λG can be presented as
f dn
S
λG
(x) =

2λG
nl
(λGx)
2
n
−1√
(λGx)
2
n−c
, 1λG c
n
2 < x < b
n
λG
0, else
. (8)
Proof. Using Corollary 1, the CDF of dS can be given as
FdS (x) =
x∫
0
fdS (y)dy
=

0 x <
√
c
2
√
x2−c
l
√
c < x < b
1 y > b
, (9)
where c = b2 − l24 .
So, one can have the CDF of dnS/λG as
F dn
S
λG
(x) =
{
dnS
λG
≤ x
}
=
{
dS ≤ n
√
λGx
}
=

0 x < 1λG c
n
2
2
√
(xλG)
2
n−c
l
1
λG
c
n
2 < x < b
n
λG
1 x > b
n
λG
. (10)
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9Therefore, the PDF of dnS/λG can be obtained, as it is the derivation of Eq. (10).
Then, the proof is completed.
Observing Eq. (3), and using Eqs. (5) and (8), the CDF of γS can be calculated as
FγS (γ) = Pr
{
λG
|hGS |2
dnS
< γ
}
= Pr
{
|hGS |2 < d
n
S
λG
γ
}
=
∫ ∞
0
F|hGS |2 (tγ) f dnS
λG
(t) dt
= 1− 2λG
nl
∫ bn
λG
c
n
2
λG
exp
(
− tγ
gGS
)
(λGt)
2
n
−1√
(λGt)
2
n − c
dt.
(11)
For analytical tractability, in this work, we only consider cases that the path loss factor is n = 2, which
is suitable for the case of infinite space and match the open air space scenarios considered in this work,
as suggested in [29].
Then, we can further calculate the CDF of γS as
FγS (γ) = 1−
λG
l
∫ b2
λG
c
λG
exp
(
− tγ
gGS
)
1√
λGt− c
dt
= 1−
√
λG
l
∫ b2
λG
c
λG
exp
(
− tγ
gGS
)
1√
t− cλG
dt
= 1−ASγ− 12 exp (−BSγ) erf
(
CSγ
1
2
)
,
(12)
where AS =
2
√
pigGSλG
l , BS =
c
gGSλG
, and CS =
√
b2−c
gGSλG
.
C. The Derivation of The PDF of γE
Lemma 1. As E is uniformly distributed in the coverage space of S, the PDF of dE can be written as
fdE (x) =

3x2
R3G
, if 0 ≤ x ≤ RG
0, else
. (13)
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Proof. The PDF of the distance between E and S can be easily calculated as fD(x) = 32piR3G . Therefore,
we can have the CDF of dE as
FdE (x) =
x∫
0
pi/2∫
0
2pi∫
0
3
2piR3G
sinφid
2
i dθidφid (di)
=

0, x < RG
x3
R3G
, 0 ≤ x ≤ RG
1, x > RG
. (14)
Thus, one can easily achieve the PDF of dE as the derivative of Eq. (14).
Then, the proof is completed.
So, it is easy to have the CDF of dnE/λG as
F dn
E
λG
(x) =
{
dnE
λG
≤ x
}
=
{
dE ≤ n
√
λGx
}
=

0, x ≤ 0
λG
3
n
R3G
x
3
n 0 < x ≤ RGnλG
1 x ≥ RGnλG
. (15)
Accordingly, the PDF of dnE/λG can be derived as
f dn
E
λG
(x) =

3λG
3
n
nR3G
x
3
n
−1 if 0 < x ≤ RGnλG
0 else
. (16)
Observing Eq. (4) and using [30, Eq. (3.351.1)] and Eqs. (5) and (16), the PDF of γE can be calculated
as
fγE (x) =
∞∫
0
yf|hGE |2 (yx)f dnE
λG
(y) dy
=
3λG
3
n
nR3GgGE
RG
n
λG∫
0
y exp
(
− yx
gGE
)
y
3
n
−1dy
= ηx−
3
n
−1Υ
(
1 +
3
n
,
RG
n
λGgGE
x
)
, (17)
where η = 3λG
3
n gGE
3
n
nR3G
and Υ (α, x) =
∫ x
0 e
−ttα−1dt is the lower incomplete Gamma function, as defined
by [30, (8.350.1)].
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D. The Calculation of SOP
Therefore, the instantaneous secrecy capacity of the uplink transmission can be presented as
Cs,up (γS , γE) = max {log2 (1 + γS)− log2 (1 + γE), 0} . (18)
In this work, SOP is defined as the probability that the secrecy capacity is less than a outage threshold
Rs, which can be written as
Pout,up = Pr {Cs,up (γS , γE) ≤ Rs}
= Pr {log2 (1 + γS)− log2 (1 + γE) ≤ Rs}
= Pr {γS ≤ ΘγE + Θ− 1} ,
(19)
where Θ = 2Rs .
It must be noted that obtaining a closed-form result for Eq. (19) is almost impossible and/or too
complex. Therefore in the subsequent section, the lower bound of the SOP is considered4, which has
been utilized in many works [31, 32], as
P Lout,up = Pr {γS 6 ΘγE}
=
∫ ∞
0
FγS (ΘγE)fγE (γE) dγE .
(20)
Then, using Eqs. (12) and (17), Υ (a, z) = G1,11,2
[
z
∣∣1
a,0
]
, erf (x) = pi−0.5G1,11,2
[
x2
∣∣1
0.5,0
]
, exp (−x) =
G1,00,1
[
x
∣∣−
0
]
, and utilizing the integral equation presented in [33, (20)], we can calculate SOP as
PLout,up =
∫ ∞
0
FγS (Θx) fγE (x) dx
= 1− ASη√
Θ
∫ ∞
0
x−3 exp (−BSΘx) erf
(
CS
√
Θx
1
2
)
Υ
(
5
2
,
R2G
λGgGE
x
)
dx
= 1− ASη√
Θpi
∫ ∞
0
x−3G1,00,1
[
BSΘx
∣∣−
0
]
G1,11,2
[
C2SΘx
∣∣1
0.5,0
]
G1,11,2
[
R2G
λGgGE
x
∣∣1
2.5,0
]
dx
= 1− ASη
(
C2Θ
)3
√
Θpi
∫ ∞
0
G1,00,1
[
BSΘx
∣∣−
0
]
G1,11,2
[
C2SΘx
∣∣∣−2−2.5,−3 ]G1,11,2 [ R2GλGgGE x ∣∣12.5,0
]
dx
= 1− ASηC
6
SΘ
2
BS
√
Θpi
G1,0:1,1:1,10,1:1,2:1,2
(
1
−
∣∣∣∣−2−2.5,−3 ∣∣∣∣12.5,0 ∣∣∣∣C2SBS , R
2
G
BSΘλGgGE
)
(21)
where Gm,np,q
[
x
∣∣∣a1,··· ,apb1,··· ,bq ] = 12pii ∫
m∏
j=1
Γ(bj−s)
n∏
j=1
Γ(1−aj+s)
q∏
j=m+1
Γ(1−bj+s)
p∏
j=n+1
Γ(aj−s)
xsds is the Meijer’s G-function, as defined
by [30, Eq. (9.301)], and Gm1,n1:m2,n2:m3,n3p1,q1:p2,q2:p3,q3 [·] is the EGBMGF function, which can be easily realized
by utilizing MATHEMATICA R© (see Table 1 in [34]).
4In this work, the lower bound of SOP is considered by exploiting the fact that, compared with ΘγE + Θ−1, a lower outage
threshold, ΘγE , represents a more rigorous outage request for γS and is more useful from the engineering perspective.
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IV. SECRECY OUTAGE ANALYSIS FOR DOWNLINK
As shown in Fig. 3, it is assumed that G is uniformly distributed in the base of the cap with height
(RS + h), which is a circle with radius RC =
√
R2S − h2. In the following, we name the spherical cap
shown in Fig. 3 as S1 and its volume as VS1 =
pi
3
(
4R3S − 3RSh2 + h3
)
.
Therefore, similar to last section, we can obtain the SOP for the downlink transmission as
PLout,dn =
∫ ∞
0
FγG (Θx) fγE (x) dx, (22)
where γG =
PS |hSG|2
dnGN0
= λS
|hSG|2
dnG
is the received SNR at G, PS is the transmit power at S, λS = PSN0 ,
γE =
PS |hSE |2
dnEN0
= λS
|hSE |2
dnE
is the received SNR at E.
As depicted in Fig. 3 and considering the randomness of the positions of G and E, one can have
PLout,dn =
∫
VS1
Pr{γG ≤ ΘγE}dVS1
=
∫
VSp
Pr{γG ≤ ΘγE}dVS1
− VS2
VSp
∫
VS2
Pr{γG ≤ ΘγE}dVS2
= ISp − h
2 (3RS − h)
4RS
3 IS2 , (23)
where ISp =
∫
VSp
Pr{γG ≤ ΘγE}dVS1 , IS2 =
∫
VS2
Pr{γG ≤ ΘγE}dVS2 , Sp is the sphere with radius RS
and volume as VSp = 43piRS
3, the spherical cap (S2) with the height (RS − h) and volume VS2 =
pih2
(
RS − h3
)
.
In the following two subsections, we will calculate ISp and IS2 , respectively.
A. The Derivation of ISp
Lemma 2. When E is uniformly distributed in the ball with the centra, S, the PDF of dnE/λS can
presented as
f dn
E
λS
(x) =

3λS
3
n
nR3S
x
3
n
−1 if 0 ≤ x ≤ RSnλS
0 else
. (24)
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Proof. As suggested in [21], when E is randomly distributed in Sp, the CDF of dE can be given as
FdE (x) =
x∫
0
pi∫
0
2pi∫
0
3
4piRS
3d
2
E sinφEdθEdφEd (dE)
=

0 x < 0
x3
R3S
0 ≤ x ≤ RS
1 x > RS
. (25)
So, one can have the CDF of dnE/λS as
F dn
E
λS
(x) =
{
dnE
λS
≤ x
}
=
{
dE ≤ n
√
λSx
}
=

0, x < 0
λS
3
n
R3S
x
3
n 0 ≤ x ≤ RSnλS
1 x ≥ RSnλS
. (26)
Thus, one can easily obtain the PDF of dnE/λS as it is the derivative of Eq. (24).
Then, the proof is completed.
Observing Eq. (4), and using Eqs. (5) and (24), the PDF of γE can be calculated as
fγE (x) =
∞∫
0
yf|hSE |2 (yx)f dnE
λS
(y) dy
=
3λS
3
n
nR3SgSE
RS
n
λS∫
0
y
3
n exp
(
− yx
gSE
)
dy
=
3λS
3
n gSE
3
n
nR3S
x−
3
n
−1γ
(
1 +
3
n
,
RS
n
λGgSE
x
)
= BEx
− 3
n
−1G1,11,2
[
CEx
∣∣∣11+ 3
n
,0
]
, (27)
where BE =
3(λSgSE)
3
n
nR3S
and CE = RS
n
λSgSE
.
Lemma 3. When G is uniformly distributed in the circle with radius RC , the PDF of dnG/λS can presented
as
f dn
G
λS
(x) =

2λS
2
n
nR2C
x
2
n
−1 if h
n
λS
≤ x ≤ (RC2+h2)
n
2
λS
0 else
. (28)
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Proof. When G is uniformly distributed in the circle with radius RC , as shown in [12], one can have
the PDF of r as
fr (x) =
2x
R2C
. (29)
As d2G = h
2+r2 and using Eq. (29), the CDF of dG =
√
h2+r2 can be presented as
FdG (x) =
x2
R2C
− h
2
R2C
, h ≤ x ≤
√
RC
2 + h2= RG. (30)
Therefore, one can have the CDF of dnG/λS as
F dn
G
λS
(x) =
{
dnG
λS
≤ x
}
=
{
dG ≤ n
√
λSx
}
=

0 x ≤ hnλS
λS
2
n
R2C
x
2
n − h2R2C
hn
λS
≤ x ≤ (RC2+h2)
n
2
λS
1 x ≥ (RC2+h2)
n
2
λS
. (31)
So, the PDF of dnG/λS can be obtained as it is the derivative of Eq. (31).
Then, the proof is completed.
So, using [30, Eq. (3.351.1)], and Eqs. (5) and (28), the PDF of γG can be calculated as
fγG (x) =
∞∫
0
yf|hSG|2 (yx)f dnG
λS
(y) dy
=
1
gSG
(RC2+h2)
n
2
λS∫
hn
λS
y exp
(
− yx
gSG
)
2λS
2
n
nR2C
y
2
n
−1dy
=
2λS
2
n
nR2CgSG
(RC2+h2)
n
2
λS∫
0
y
2
n exp
(
− yx
gSG
)
dy − 2λS
2
n
nR2CgSG
hn
λS∫
0
y
2
n exp
(
− yx
gSG
)
dy
= CGx
− 2
n
−1G1,11,2
 (RC2 + h2)n2
λSgSG
x
∣∣∣∣∣ 1
1 + 2n , 0
− CGx− 2n−1G1,11,2
 hn
λSgSG
x
∣∣∣∣ 1
1 + 2n , 0
 ,
(32)
where CG =
2(λSgSG)
2
n
nR2C
.
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Accordingly, the CDF of γG can be easily obtained as
FγG (x) =
x∫
0
fγG (y)dy
= CG
x∫
0
y−
2
n
−1G1,11,2
 (RC2 + h2)n2
λSgSG
y
∣∣∣∣∣ 1
1 + 2n , 0
dy
− CG
x∫
0
y−
2
n
−1G1,11,2
 hn
λSgSG
y
∣∣∣∣ 1
1 + 2n , 0
dy
= CGx
− 2
nG1,22,3
 (RC2 + h2)n2
λSgSG
x
∣∣∣∣∣ 1 +
2
n , 1
1 + 2n , 0,
2
n
− CGx− 2nG1,22,3
 hn
λSgSG
x
∣∣∣∣ 1 + 2n , 1
1 + 2n , 0,
2
n

= CGx
− 2
nG1,22,3
[
AGx
∣∣∣1+ 2n ,11+ 2
n
,0, 2
n
]
− CGx− 2nG1,22,3
[
BGx
∣∣∣1+ 2n ,11+ 2
n
,0, 2
n
]
, (33)
where AG =
(R2C+h
2)
n
2
λSgSG
and BG = h
n
λSgSG
.
Therefore, utilizing Eqs. (38) and (33), ISp =
∫
VSp
Pr{γG ≤ γE}dVS1 can be further derived as
ISP =
∫
VSp
Pr{γG ≤ ΘγE}dVS1
=
∞∫
0
FγG (Θx)fγE (x) dx
= CGΘ
− 2
n
∞∫
0
x−
2
nG1,22,3
[
AGΘxx
∣∣∣1+ 2n ,11+ 2
n
,0, 2
n
]
fγE (x) dx− CG
∞∫
0
x−
2
nG1,22,3
[
BGΘx
∣∣∣1+ 2n ,11+ 2
n
,0, 2
n
]
fγE (x) dx
= CGBEΘ
3
nAG
5
nG3,24,4
[
CE
AGΘ
∣∣∣1, 3n ,1+ 5n ,1+ 3n1+ 3
n
, 3
n
, 5
n
,0
]
− CGBEΘ 3nBG 5nG3,24,4
[
CE
BGΘ
∣∣∣1, 3n ,1+ 5n ,1+ 3n1+ 3
n
, 3
n
, 5
n
,0
]
(34)
B. The Derivation of IS2
Lemma 4. As shown in Fig. 3, when E is uniformly distributed in the spherical cap with height (RS−h),
the PDF of dnE/λS can presented as
f dn
E
λS
(x) =

2pi
nVS
(
λS
3
nx
3
n
−1 − hλS 2nx 2n−1
)
if h
n
λS
≤ x ≤ RnGλS
0 else
. (35)
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Proof. When E is randomly distributed in S2, the CDF of dE can be given as
FdE (x) =
1
VS
∫ arccos(hx )
0
∫ x
h
cos(φ)
∫ 2pi
0
δ2 sin (φ) dθdδdφ
=
2pi
VS
∫ arccos(hx )
0
∫ x
h
cos(φ)
δ2 sin (φ) dδdφ
=
2pi
3VS
∫ arccos(hx )
0
(
x3 − h3sec3 (φ)) sin (φ) dφ
=
pi
3VS
(
2x3 − 3hx2 + h3) . (36)
So, the CDF of dnE/λS can be obtained as
F dn
E
λS
(x) = Pr
{
dnE
λS
< x
}
= Pr
{
dE < (λSx)
1
n
}
=
pi
3VS
(
2
(
(λSx)
1
n
)3 − 3h((λSx) 1n)2 + h3)
=
pi
3VS
(
2λS
3
nx
3
n − 3hλS 2nx 2n + h3
)
. (37)
Thus, the the PDF of dnE/λS can be derived via performing differential operation on Eq. (37).
Then, the proof is completed.
Observing Eq. (4), and using [30, Eq. (3.351.1)], Eqs. (5) and (35), the PDF of γE can be calculated
as
fγE (x) =
∞∫
0
yf|hSE |2 (yx)f dnE
λS
(y) dy
= E1
∫ RnG
λS
hn
λS
y
3
n exp
(
− yx
gSE
)
dy
− E2
∫ RnG
λS
hn
λS
y
2
n exp
(
− yx
gSE
)
dy
= E1gSE
3
n
+1f1
(
3
n
)
− E2gSE 2n+1f1
(
2
n
)
, (38)
where E1 = 2piλS
3
n
nVSgSG
, E2 = 2pihλS
2
n
nVSgSG
and f1 (a) =
∫ RnS
λS
hn
λS
ya exp
(
− yxgSG
)
dy.
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Therefore, using Eqs. (33) and (38), and the integral equation of Meijer’s G-function presented in [35],
IS2 =
∫
VS2
Pr{γG ≤ γE}dVS2 can be further derived as
IS2 =
∞∫
0
FγG (Θx)fγE (x) dx
= CGΘ
− 2
n
∫ ∞
0
x−
2
nG1,22,3
[
AGΘx
∣∣∣1+ 2n ,11+ 2
n
,0, 2
n
]
fγE (x) dx
− CGΘ− 2n
∫ ∞
0
x−
2
nG1,22,3
[
AGΘx
∣∣∣1+ 2n ,11+ 2
n
,0, 2
n
]
fγE (x) dx
= CGΘ
− 2
n (f2 (AG)− f2 (BG)) , (39)
where
f2 (t) =
∫ ∞
0
x−
2
nG1,22,3
[
tΘx
∣∣∣1+ 2n ,11+ 2
n
,0, 2
n
]
fγE (x) dx
= E1gSG
3
n
+1
∫ ∞
0
f1
(
3
n
)
x−
2
nG1,22,3
[
tΘx
∣∣∣1+ 2n ,11+ 2
n
,0, 2
n
]
dx
− E2gSG 2n+1
∫ ∞
0
f1
(
2
n
)
x−
2
nG1,22,3
[
tΘx
∣∣∣1+ 2n ,11+ 2
n
,0, 2
n
]
dx
= E1gSG
3
n
+1
(
f3
(
3
n
, t, CE
)
− f3
(
3
n
, t,DE
))
− E2gSG 2n+1
(
f3
(
2
n
, t, CE
)
− f3
(
2
n
, t,DE
))
(40)
and
f3 (s, t, b) =
∫ ∞
0
x−s−1−
2
nG1,11,2
[
bx
∣∣1
s+1,0
]
G1,22,3
[
tΘx
∣∣∣1+ 2n ,11+ 2
n
,0, 2
n
]
dx
= bs+
2
nG2,34,4
[
tΘ
b
∣∣∣1+ 2n ,1, 2n ,1+s+ 2n1+ 2
n
,s+ 2
n
,0, 2
n
]
. (41)
Finally, the SOP over the downlink, Pout,dn, can be obtained by inserting Eqs. (34) and (39) into Eq.
(23).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, Monte Carlo simulations are carried out to validate our proposed analytical expressions
for the SOP over both downlink and uplink. The main adopted parameters are set as RS = 20 m, h = 10
m, RG = 15 m, Rs = 0.1 bits/s/Hz, λS = 5 dB, λG = 1.25 dB and gGE = gSE = 1.1. Moreover,
the coverage distance of the source UAV is set from tens of meters to hundreds of meters to reflect the
practical scenarios of UAVs in civil applications. During each case, we run 105 trials for the Monte Carlo
simulations and also consider 105 times of the realizations of the considered systems. Furthermore, all
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following numerical results are given while the mean value of the power gain over the link between S
and G (gGS or gSG) increasing, to show the system performance that can be achieved in each potential
channel situations.
A. Secrecy Outage over The Uplink
In this subsection, we will investigate the secrecy outage performance over the uplink of the considered
system shown in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 5, numerical results are presented to address the influence of gGE on the secrecy outage
performance of the considered system. We can see that the mean value of the power gain over G − E
link (gGE) shows a negative effect on the secrecy outage, as a large gGE leads to degraded secrecy outage
performance. Because a large gGE represents a high channel gain for the eavesdropping link from G to
E.
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
Fig. 5: Secrecy outage vs. gGS for various gGE
The effect of λG (the transmit SNR at G) on the secrecy outage performance of the considered system
is studied in Fig. 6. λG does not exhibit a significant influence on the secrecy outage performance, while
a large λG incurs improved secrecy outage performance. Moreover, as presented in Fig. 6, the lines for
the lower boundary of the SOP with λG = 0 and 5 dB are almost overlapped with each other. Then, we
can have that increasing λG is not an effective way to improve the secrecy outage performance of the
considered system. Because the changing of λG will show the same trend and scale on the received SNR
at S and E, which can also be proved by Eqs. (3) and (4).
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Fig. 6: Secrecy outage vs. gGS for various λS
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Fig. 7: Secrecy outage vs. gGS for various RG
Fig. 7 presents the secrecy outage performance of the considered system, while the radius of the
coverage space of G, RG = 1000, 2000 and 3000 m5. One can easily observe that the Pout,up with
various RG is similar. Moreover, we can also find that RG (the radius of the coverage space of the
ground receiver, G) shows a negative effect on the secrecy outage performance, which is more apparent
when RG is small. This comes from the fact that a large RG leads to a large coverage space of G,
5In this work, the effects of the radius of the coverage space of S and G on the secrecy outage performance are considered.
Because the radius of the coverage space of a transmitter not only depends on the transmit power at the transmitter but also is
determined by the sensitivity of the receiver.
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and then the probability that the distance dGE gets large increases, which finally results in bad channel
quality of the eavesdropping link.
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100
Fig. 8: Secrecy outage vs. gGS for various Rs
In Fig. 8, the secrecy outage performance of the considered system with various outage threshold
(Rs) is studied. A large Rs shows a large Pout,up, which means the secrecy outage performance of the
considered system gets worse. It is because that a large Rs represents a large outage threshold.
Furthermore, it can be seen from Figs. 5-8 that increasing gGS can improve the secrecy outage
performance of the considered system. Because a large gGS represents a high channel gain for the
main link from G to S. Also, simulation and analysis results match very well with each other, which
verifies the correctness of our proposed analytical model.
B. Secrecy Outage over The Downlink
In this subsection, the secrecy outage performance over the uplink of the considered system (shown
in Fig. 3) will be studied.
Fig. 9 depicts the numerical results of the secrecy outage performance with various the mean value
of the power gain over S −E link, gSE , while gSG increasing. One can observe that the secrecy outage
performance with a small gSE outperforms that with a large gSE , as a large gSE means better channel
gain for the eavesdropping link, which leads to more information being overheard.
In Fig. 10, we investigate how the secrecy outage performance is influenced by λS (the transmit SNR at
S). The secrecy outage lines for different λS (namely, −5, 0, and 5 dB) overlap with each other, which
indicates that adjusting λS cannot improve the secrecy outage performance of the considered system.
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Fig. 9: Secrecy outage vs. gSG for various gGE
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Fig. 10: Secrecy outage vs. gSG for various λS
This observation is similar to the one obtained for the uplink from Fig. 6. Also, it can be explained that
increasing λS will improve the received SNR at both G and E, and then the secrecy outage performance
of the considered system cannot be improved anymore.
The impact of RS (the radius of the coverage space of S) on the secrecy outage performance of the
considered system is shown in Fig. 11, while gSG increasing. It is shown that the curves of Pout,dn for
RS = 1000, 2000 and 3000 m fully overlap with each other, which reveals that RS has no influence on
the secrecy outage performance of the considered system, because adjusting Rs exhibits a same influence
on the transmission distances of S−E and S−G links. This finding is similar to the one achieved from
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Fig. 7, both of which demonstrate that enlarging the coverage space of the transmitter cannot improve
the secrecy outage performance.
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Fig. 11: Secrecy outage vs. gSG for various RS
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Fig. 12: Secrecy outage vs. gSG for various Rs
Fig. 12 presents the secrecy outage performance of the considered system with various outage threshold
(Rs). The results show that Pout,dn with a small Rs outperforms that with a large Rs. Because a large
Rs implies that the probability that secrecy capacity of the considered system is less than the threshold
will increases. This observation is as same as the one seen from Fig. 8 for the uplink.
In Fig. 13, the SOP lines for various the height of S, h, are depicted while RS = 1000 m. Clearly,
the height of S, h, shows a negative effect on SOP, because a large h leads to a low received SNR
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Fig. 13: Secrecy outage vs. gSG for various h
at the ground receiver, G, and further incurs the degraded secrecy outage performance. Though the
secrecy performance will degrade while the height of the UAV increases, optimizations can be set up to
realize optimal secrecy performance vis choosing suitable heights for the UAV, and some schemes can
be designed to safeguard the security of UAV system, e.g., jamming and artificial noise schemes.
Finally, as presented in Figs. 9-13, it is noted that gSG exhibits a similar effect on the secrecy outage
performance of the considered system as gGS does in Figs. 5-8. This can also be explained by the idea of
the reason given at the end of the last subsection. Moreover, simulation and analysis results show perfect
matching with each other, which demonstrates the accuracy of the proposed analysis model.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the secrecy outage performance of a UAV system with linear trajectory
and derived the closed-form analytical expressions for the lower boundary of the SOP of both downlink
and uplink. We consider the randomness of the positions of all UAVs and the ground receiver to make
the considered system more practical.
Observing from the numerical results, we can reach some remarks as follows:
1) The radius of the coverage space of S does not exhibit an apparent impact on the secrecy outage
performance over the downlink, as well as that of G showing a weak influence on the secrecy outage
performance over the uplink.
2) The transmit SNR at S and G provides a very weak impact on the secrecy outage performance over
the downlink and the uplink, respectively.
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3) The height of S exhibits a negative effect on the secrecy outage performance of the considered
system.
In this work, we mainly deal with modeling and analyzing the secrecy outage performance of the
target system. In future work, we will work on the methods to improve the secrecy outage performance
of the target system. e.g., cooperative jamming and artificial noise.
APPENDIX: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
As C is the midpoint of AB, it is easy to obtain AC = l/2. Then, we can have cosA = l2b . According
to Cosine theorem, we can also achieve
cosA =
b2 + x2 − y2
2bx
. (42)
Solving this quadric equation leads
x =
l ±
√
4y2 + l2 − 4b2
2
= g (y) . (43)
Since S is uniformly distributed over AB, the PDF of x is given as
fx (x) =
1
l
, 0 ≤ x ≤ l. (44)
Using transformation of random variable, we can obtain the PDF of y as
fy (y) = fx (g (y))
∣∣g′ (y)∣∣
=

2y
l
√
4y2+l2−4b2 if
√
b2 − l24 ≤ y ≤ b
0 else
. (45)
Then, the proof is completed.
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